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9.1  Introduction 
The basic structure of the Japanese tax system since the Shoup reform of 
1949 can be characterized by two factors: heavy reliance on direct taxes, es- 
pecially  on individual and corporate income taxes at the national  level, and 
the absence of a broad-based indirect tax such as the value-added tax (VAT) in 
European countries.  A significant change has been brought about by  the re- 
form bill that passed the Diet in December  1988. This bill introduced a new 
indirect tax called shohi-zei (consumption tax) while reducing the burden of 
both individual and corporate income taxes. 
Opinions concerning the consumption tax were sharply divided. Not only 
opposition parties but also some members of the ruling Liberal Democratic 
Party (LDP) opposed the government's proposal. Major arguments against the 
consumption tax can be summarized as follows:' 
1. The most commm complaint against the consumption tax was that it is 
regressive. Thus critics, especially opposition parties, argued that the reform 
was relatively favorable for middle- and upper-class incomes. 
2. There was an argument, also from the opposition parties,  that a con- 
sumption tax (or indirect taxes in general), which people are relatively uncon- 
scious of paying, would make it possible to finance the growth of a big gov- 
ernment. 
3. A more specific complaint  about  the consumption tax was voiced  by 
small business owners, important supporters of the LDP. These people main- 
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tained that in practice it would be difficult for them to shift the burden, so that 
they must bear it themselves. They also argued that the costs involved in com- 
plying with tax collection, such as the cost of  making new forms, revising 
accounting slips, and modifying computer software, would impose an undue 
burden on businesses.2 
The government  argued  two major  points  in defending  the consumption 
tax. One was the necessity of reforming the indirect tax system. It was argued 
that the former system of individual commodity taxes was full of  problems. 
The other was related to the horizontal equity issue. It has long been pointed 
out that the most serious problem of the Japanese tax system is that the income 
tax burden of salaried workers is heavier than that of small business owners 
and farmers of the same income. While opposition parties argued that a solu- 
tion must be found within the framework of the income tax system, the gov- 
ernment argued that the introduction of a consumption tax, which distributes 
tax burden evenly among people of different occupations, was a more realistic 
solution to the problem. 
Although the importance of  these issues cannot be denied, they fail to cap- 
ture the most important implication of the consumption tax, namely, its poten- 
tial role in the economy to finance increased social security expenditures. Al- 
though the need for financing the future welfare society was pointed out by 
the government as one of the reasons for the reform, the discussion was quite 
unsatisfactory  in that it was made only in vague and abstract terms and the 
reforms of  tax  system and social  security system were not treated  simulta- 
neously. In this paper I will concentrate on this issue and consider long-term 
implications of tax reform. 
I review trends in tax burden and social security payments in section 9.2 
and population trends in section 9.3. Based on the population forecast,  I ex- 
amine projected increases  in social security payments and the tax burden in 
section 9.4. Section 9.5 is an analysis of  relative well-being of workers and 
retired people in a future society. My basic conclusion is that the role a con- 
sumption tax plays  in spreading the burden evenly among different genera- 
tions will become very important in a society in which the burden on workers 
is bound to rise. 
9.2  'Ikends in National Burden and Social Security Payments 
9.2.1  Tax and Social Security Burden 
Table 9.1 shows the trend in tax revenue and social security contributions. 
Tax burden measured by the ratio to national income was quite stable until the 
early 1970s at about 19 percent. The ratio rose in FY 1973 but fell sharply in 
FY  1975 due to a recession caused by the oil shock. It recovered at the end of 
2.  This argument was somewhat superficial. Their true apprehension was that the tax authority 
would be  able to obtain detailed records of  transactions (especially if  the invoice system were 
used), so that their transactions would become transparent to the tax authority. 213  Aging of Population, Social Security, and Tax Reform 
Table 9.1  ’kends in Government Revenues in Japan, FY 1960-90 (%) 




























































































































































Source: Ministry of  Finance, Fiscal and Monetary Statistics (Tokyo: Government Printing Bu- 
reau,  1960-90). 
Notes: Figures are those of  the settlement basis, except for FY  1989 (revised budget base) and 
FY 1990 (initial budget base). RNB = national burden; RSOC = social security contribution; 
RTAX = tax. These are ratios to national income. RDIR  = share of direct taxes in national tax. 
the 1970s and is now much higher than the pre-oil-shock level. Social security 
contributions have also increased dramatically. Their ratio to national income 
was only 3.3 percent and far smaller than that of  tax in FY 1960. By FY 1987, 
it had risen to  11  .O percent, which is about one-half of tax. The sum of  tax 
and social security contributions is usually called the “national burden.” Its 
ratio to national income rose from 24.3 percent in FY 1970 to 38.5 percent in 
FY 1987.3  In FY 1990, it is estimated to be 40.4 percent. 
3. In the case of  social security contributions, the increase in the burden was a result of explicit 
revisions in the system. For example, the rate of  contribution to the Employees’ Pension (Kosei 
Nenkin) was raised (in several stages) from 6.4 percent in FY 1970 to 12.4 percent in  FY  1986 214  Yukio Noguchi 
The composition of taxes has also changed significantly. While the ratio of 
indirect taxes to national income in recent years has been about the same as 
that in the  1960s, that of  direct taxes has increased  considerably  during the 
past decade. As a result, the share of  direct taxes, which was about one-half 
in 1960s, has risen to about 60 percent in recent years. A more distinct trend 
can be observed in national  taxes.  In FY  1970, the share of  direct taxes in 
national  taxes was 66.1 percent.  In FY 1988, it had  risen  to 73.2 percent. 
Among the national taxes, income tax has increased the most sharply. In FY 
1970, the ratio of  income tax revenue  to national  income was 4.0 percent, 
whereas in FY 1986, it had risen to 6.4 percent. 
9.2.2  Social Security 
Table 9.2 shows the trend in social security payments. Their ratio to na- 
tional income was stable at about 6 percent during the 1960s. Significant im- 
provements in social security programs were made during FY 1972 and 1973. 
Improvements in FY 1973 were so dramatic that this year was called “the first 
year of the welfare era.” Reflecting these improvements, the ratio rose signif- 
icantly during the late 1970s. During the 1980s, however, the ratio was stable 
at about 14 percent, due to the tight budget policy. 
Public  pension  payments  and  medical  expenses account for most  of  the 
social security payments. Increase in public pension is very dramatic. Its ratio 
to national income was only about  1.3 percent during the 1960s. Due to the 
significant improvements in the payment level and to the increase in the num- 
ber of  recipients,  the ratio has risen  to the present  level of  over 7 percent. 
Medical expenses also increased significantly during the  1970s. During the 
1980s, however, the ratio has become rather stable at about 5.6 percent. 
9.2.3  International Comparison 
In spite of the recent increase, the tax burden in Japan is still low compared 
to that in European countries. The main reason is that the share of social se- 
curity expenditures in national income remains small in Japan. This is clearly 
seen in the international data (table 9.3). This does not, however, imply that 
social security programs in Japan are insufficient. On the contrary, improve- 
ments undertaken during the early  1970s made the Japanese social security 
system comparable, and in some respects even superior, to those of European 
countries.4 
(including the employees’ share) as shown in table 9.2. In the case of income tax, however, the 
increase in the burden in recent years was not the result of explicit revisions in the income tax law. 
Rather, it was “bracket creep,” which occurs when a progressive tax structure is not indexed to 
offset inflation or economic growth.  Until the early  1970s, the income tax law was amended 
almost every year in order to prevent this mechanism from operating. A significant change in this 
trend came after the first oil shock. Adjustments to the income tax law were not undertaken for 
seven full years between FY 1977 and 1984. 
4. For example, average per capita old age pension benefit in Japan is  1.9 times higher than 
that in the United Kingdom and I .6 times higher than that in Germany. For a detailed discussion, 
see Noguchi (1986). 215  Aging of Population, Social Security, and Tax Reform 
Table 9.2  Bends in Social Security in Japan, FY 1965-87 (%) 
~  ~~ 






































































3.50  3.50 
3.50  5.50 
3.40  5.50 
3.40  5.50 
3.30  6.20 
3.50  6.40 
3.42  6.40 
3.60  6.40 
3.53  7.60 
4. I9  7.60 
4.62  7.60 
4.90  9.10 
4.96  9.10 
5.32  9.10 
5.43  9.10 
5.50  10.60 
5.65  10.60 
5.69  10.60 
5.70  10.60 
5.60  10.60 
5.56  12.40 
5.70  12.40 
























Source: Secretariat of the Social Security System Council, Yearbook of  Social Security (Tokyo: 
Shakai, Hoken Hoki, Kenkyukai,  1989). 
Notes: RSOP = social security payment; RPEN  = public pension; RMED  = medical expenses. 
These are ratios to national income. RCON  = rate of welfare pension contribution; R65  = ratio 
of  people over age 65. 
Table 9.3  Social Security Payments and Demographic Condition, 
International Comparison 
Country  RSOC  RNB  R65 
Japan  12.  I  40.4  12.0 
United States  9.9  36.3  11.9 
United Kingdom  11.4  53.3  15.1 
Germany  22.4  52.3  14.7 
France  28.2  62.3  13.0 
Sweden  18.9  77.0  17.9 
Source: Yoshio Nakajima, Anarano Chojushai Dokuhon (Handbook for the aged society) (Tokyo: 
Daiamondo Sha, 1990). 
Notes: RSOC  = social security contribution; RNB  = national burden. These are ratios to na- 
tional income. R65  = ratio of  people over age 65. RSOC and RNB are those for 1987 (Japan’s 
figures are for FY 1990 budget; United Kingdom figures are for 1986). R65 is for 1985 (Japan’s 
figure is for 1990). 216  Yukio Noguchi 
The essential reason for the relatively low level of social security expendi- 
ture is that the percentage of elderly people in the Japanese population is low 
and Japan’s public pension system has not reached  “maturity,” meaning that 
as yet relatively few people have become entitled to full pension benefits. 
As the years  go by,  this  situation will  inevitably  change,  and the  public 
pension programs will automatically mature. Moreover, the aging of the pop- 
ulation is expected to take place rapidly in the future, as reviewed in section 
9.3. These factors would  increase social security expenditures considerably 
even if no improvements were made in the system. 
9.3  Changes in Population Structure 
Let us review changes in population structure (table 9.4).5  Japan’s popula- 
tion will experience dramatic aging in the coming decades.  The number of 
people over age 65, which was about 5 million in  1960 and is now about  15 
million, is expected to increase to about 30 million by 2015. The ratio of  this 
age group to the total population was about 5 percent for many years. It began 
to rise in the latter half of the 1960s and is now about 10 percent. The number 
is expected to rise to about 15 percent at the end of this century, which is about 
the same level as that of the European countries presently, and to 23.6 percent 
in 2020. At that time, Japan will have one of the most aged populations in the 
world (table 9.5). 
A significant change is also observed in the number of  people of  working 
age, which I define as 20 through  64. Population  in this age group doubled 
from 34 million in 1945 to 70 million in 1980. The rate of growth of popula- 
tion in this age group showed a significant decline around 1980. A more dra- 
matic change is expected in the future. The absolute number of people in this 
age group will decrease during the period from about 2000 through 2020. 
As a result, the dependency ratio, which I define as the number of  people 
over 65 per person of working age and which is shown by c/B in table 9.4, 
will undergo an even more dramatic change. The ratio, which remained at a 
relatively stable level of about 10 percent until about  1975, will rise to 22.9 
percent in 1995 and to as high as 44.1 percent in 2020.6 
In general, aging of population is caused by two factors: a decline in  the 
birth rate and an increase in longevity. Both factors have contributed and will 
continue to contribute to aging in Japan. The total fertility rate has fallen from 
2.37 in  1955 to 1.76 in  1985. The average male life expectancy at birth has 
increased from 63.6 years in 1955 to 74.8 years in 1985. 
In the case of Japan, another factor causes the above change. It is the exis- 
5. The future figures  are the projections (the “middle series”) by  the Institute of  Population 
Problem of the Ministry of Health and Welfare (1987). 
6. In terms of the dependency ratio including children, which is shown by (A + C)/B in table 
9.4,  the change is not so dramatic. The figure is now at the historic minimum and will gradually 
rise. 217  Aging of Population, Social Security, and Tax Reform 
Table 9.4  Trends in Japan’s Population Structure 
Population by  Age Groups (in thousands) 
A  B  C  D 
Annual Growth Rate 
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Table 9.4  (continued) 
Share of Age Groups  Dependency Ratio 
AID  BID  CID  CIB  (A +  C)IB 
2020  0.229  0.535  0.236  0.441  0.869 
2025  0.223  0.543  0.234  0.432  0.842 
Source: Past figures are from the National Census Statistics Bureau, Japan Srarisrical Yearbook 
(Tokyo: Japan Statistical  Association,  1990) Future  figures are projections by  the Institute of 
Population Problems (1987). 
tence of the “bulge generation” (dankai no sedai), or the baby-boom genera- 
tion, which consists of  about 8 million people born during 1947-49.  During 
this period, the number of births was about 2.7 million a year, about  1 million 
more than that since then.’ This generation made the age group 0-19  increase 
during the period  1950 through  1965. Since the late sixties, this generation 
has shifted to the 20-64  age group. They will shift to the group over age 65 
around  2005, increasing the population of  this age group sharply and at the 
same time decreasing the working-age population. 
9.4  Increase in Social Security Payments and National Burden: 
Projections 
9.4.1  Social Security Payments 
The above mentioned change in population,  together with “maturing”  of 
public pension programs, will cause dramatic increases in social security pay- 
ments. I first review several projections prepared by the government and other 
organizations (table 9.6). 
The Economic Council Projection.  The most  comprehensive  projection  is 
from the Economic Council in 1982 (A in table 9.6). According to this projec- 
tion, the ratio of social security payments to national income will increase to 
21.6 percent  in the year 2000 and to 31.2 percent  in 2020.  Most of  the in- 
crease will result from the growth of public pension payments: their share in 
national income will rise to 19.2 percent in 2020.8 
It may be argued that this projection has an overestimation bias due to two 
factors. First, this was made before the significant reform of the public pen- 
sion system in  1986, in which measures were taken to mitigate the effects of 
maturing. Second, this projection does not take into account effects of various 
7.  The second wave (or the “echo effect”) of the baby boom occurred during the 1970s. But the 
8. The basic assumption for estimating future benefits is that the present formula for calculating 
echo was much more gradual than the initial wave. 
benefits will remain unchanged. 219  Aging of  Population, Social Security, and Tax Reform 
Table 9.5  Percentage of People over Age 60 
1950  1980  I990  2000  2025 
~ 
Germany  14.0  19.3  20.7  23.9  31.1 
Belgium  16.0  18.3  19.9  20.9  26.9 
Denmark  13.4  19.4  20.2  20.5  29.7 
Spain  10.9  14.9  16.8  18.5  21.9 
France  16.2  17.2  18.3  19.4  25.9 
Greece  10.0  17.4  19.3  21.7  23.8 
Ireland  14.8  14.8  13.6  12.3  17.0 
Luxembourg  14.5  17.6  18.8  1.1  28.6 
Italy  12.2  17.2  19.8  21.9  26.8 
Holland  11.5  15.7  17.2  18.6  30.1 
United Kingdom  15.5  20.1  20.7  20.3  25.7 
Japan  4.9  9.  I  17.3  22.1  29.0 
Source; Genevieve Reday-Mulvey, “Work and Retirement: Future Prospects for the Baby-Boom 
Generation,” Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance 15(55)(April 1990): 100-1 13. 
Portugal  10.5  14.6  15.9  16.6  22.1 
Table 9.6  Projections of Social Security Payments (% of national income) 




Japan in the year 2000 
Social security payments  21.6  26.8  31.2 
Public pension  13.5  16.8  19.2 
Ministry of  Welfare, 
Ministry of  Finance 
Social security  21.5-23  26-29 
Rengo 
Social security  19.8-21.3  26-27 
Public pension  10.4-10.7  13.1-13.9 
Medical expenses  7.1  9.1  I1  .o 
Medical expenses  7.0-7.5  8.5-9.0 
Sources: For A, Economic Planning Agency, 2000 nen no Nihon (Japan in the year 2000) (Tokyo: 
Government Printing Bureau, 1982). For B, an estimate submitted to the Budget Committee of 
the House of  Representatives on March  10,  1988. For C, Rengo (Japan Federation of  Labor 
Unions), Towards a Welfare Sociery (Tokyo: November 1989). 
reforms made in the medical insurance system during the 1980s to hold down 
medical expenses. 
The MOF-MOW Projection. The most  recent  official projection  was made 
jointly by the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Welfare in 1988 (B in 
table 9.6). The ratio of social security expenditure to national income will rise 
26 to 29 percent in 2010, according to this projection. Note that the Economic 
Council projection  falls within  this range,  in spite of the  above-mentioned 
reforms in the social security system. 
Unfortunately, this projection does not go beyond 2010. 220  Yukio Noguchi 
The Rengo Projection.  Another projection  was made by  the Rengo (Japan 
Federation  of  Labor Unions)  in  1989. According  to this projection,  social 
security payments will be 19.8 to 21.3 percent of national income in 2000 and 
26 to 27 percent  in  2020. This is considerably  lower than the government 
projection; the major reason  is fairly low estimates of public pension pay- 
ments. 
To check the above projections, I first examine public pension. The total 
amount of public pension payments is determined by the number of recipients 
and per capita benefit. The former is represented by  the number of  elderly 
people and the latter can be represented by a trend. Thus, I estimated an equa- 
tion in which the ratio of public pension payments to national income (RPEN) 
is correlated to the ratio of people over age 65.9  Using this equation, I calcu- 
lated future values of  RPEN as column (A) in table 9.7. Compared with the 
projections reviewed above, this result seems somewhat high; it does not con- 
tain effects of possible policy changes, in particular the effect of  raising the 
eligible age. If this is taken into account, the result becomes smaller, as shown 
in column (B) in table 9.7.1° In 2020, public pension payments will be about 
21 percent of national income. This is still higher than the government projec- 
tion reviewed above (table 9.6, column [A]). However, compared to the pro- 
jections for other countries shown in table 9.8, this seems reasonable. 
Some remarks are necessary on the implications of  firms’ retirement poli- 
cies on the above estimates. There are arguments that, if retirement age can 
be raised, social security payments can be reduced. While this is not deniable 
in principle, it is hard to expect that the effect will be significant. At present, 
9.  The equation used for the projection is 
RPEN  =  -6.688  +  1.309 R65 - 0.971 DUMMY, 
(0.337)  (0.107)  (0.279) 
where RPEN is the ratio of public pension payments to national income, R65 is the ratio of people 
over age 65, and DUMMY is a dummy variable that equals  1 before 1974. The 1965-86 data are 
used. The numbers in parentheses are standard errors. The adjusted RZ  is 0.979. 
As  mentioned above, remarkable  improvements in  the social security programs were made 
during 1972 and 1973. That the coefficient of the dummy variable is significant indicates that the 
effect of the reforms is well captured by the DUMMY variable. 
The coefficient of the R65 variable indicates that the increase in RPEN is greater than the change 
in population structure. This is due to the fact that the number of years in which average workers 
have contributed always increases,  and, as a result,  per capita benefit increases. This effect is 
usually called “maturing of the pension system.” 
10.  According to the government plan, the age at which one becomes eligible for the benefit 
will be raised gradually as follows: birth years 1938-39, eligible age 61; 1940-41,62;  1942-43, 
63; 1944-45,64;  1946-,  65. Thus after 2010, all recipients will be over age 65. 
According to the government calculation, the rate of contribution for the Employees’ Pension 
can be lowered by  this measure from 3 1.5 percent to 26.1 percent in 2020. Since the system is 
virtually pay-as-you-go at this time, we may suppose that the total payment of the Employees’ 
Pension is reduced by the same percentage,  i.e., by  17.1 percent. On the other hand, total pay- 
ment of  the Employees’ Pension will be about 76 percent of the total public pension payment 
when the system matures. Therefore, total public pension payment will be reduced by  13 percent 
(= 0.17  X  0.76). 
In 2000, the rate of reduction will be about 19 percent of the steady state. Thus, the reduction 
in payment will be about 2.5 percent (= 0.13 x 0.19). 221  Aging of  Population, Social Security, and Tax Reform 
Table 9.7  Projections of Social Security Payments (% of national income) 
RPEN 
Year  (A)  (B)  RMED  RSOP 
1985  6.7  -  5.6  14.0 
2000  14.6  14.2  6.5  22.5 
2010  19.4  16.9  7.2  25.8 
2020  24.1  21.0  7.8  30.5 
Nores: RPEN  = public pension; RMED = medical expenditure; RSOP = social security pay- 
ments; A = no change in the eligible age; B = eligible age gradually raised to 65 (RSOP is for 
case B). 
Table 9.8  Share of Pension in National Income (a) 
1983  2000  2010  2020  2030 
Germany  14.0  16.4  19.8  21.7  28.2 
Denmark  9.1  10.1  11.4  14.4  17.2 
Spain  9.6  11.1  11.7  12.9  15.8 
France  14.2  16.5  17.4  21.7  25.4 
Greece  10.2  12.3  13.9  14.9  16.7 
Ireland  6.6  6.1  5.8  6.7  8.  I 
Italy  16.6  19.4  22.0  25.1  30.2 
Holland  12.6  13.5  15.2  19.8  26.0 
Portugal  8.2  10.9  11.2  12.4  15.0 
United Kingdom  8.3  7.6  7.7  8.8  10.7 
Belgium  14.1  13.9  14.9  17.0  21.1 
Source: Genevieve Reday-Mulvey, “Work and Retirement: Future Prospects for the Baby-Boom 
Generation,” Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance 15(55)(April 1990):  100-1 13. 
some firms still set their retirement age earlier than 60. This means that for 
some people even the present eligible age of 60 is troublesome. It is therefore 
probable that the difficulty of further raising the retirement age deters the re- 
alization of the government’s proposal of raising the eligible age to 65. 
In regard to medical expenses, use of the past trend will cause an overesti- 
mation bias, because significant reforms have been undertaken to curb medi- 
cal expenses. Therefore, I use the fact that per capita medical expenses for the 
elderly is about 5.2 times higher than that for younger people and estimate 
future values using the population forecasts.”  The result is shown as RMED 
in table 9.7. 
11. Note the following definitions: 
M,  M,,  and Mo:  total medical expenses, those for people under age 65, and those for people 
65 and over, respectively. 
m,  and m,:  per capita values of M,  and M,. 
N,  N,,  and No:  total population, that of  people under age 65, and that of people age 65 and 
over, respectively. 222  Yukio Noguchi 
If we suppose that the ratio of other social security expenditures to national 
income (about 1.8 percent in FY  1985) will remain unchanged, the trend in 
social security payments can be calculated as RSOP in table 9.7. It will in- 
crease by about 16 percentage points from 1985 to 2020.’* This figure will be 
used in the following analysis. 
9.4.2  National Burden 
Since Japan’s public pension programs are managed essentially  according 
to the  pay-as-you-go  method,  national  burden  must  increase to finance the 
increased expenditure.  We  may suppose that the necessary  increment in na- 
tional burden is about the same magnitude as that in social security payments, 
because  it is difficult to  expect  savings  of  this  magnitude by  cutting  other 
expenditures. 
Some people argue that since the number of children will decrease in  the 
future,  education-related  expenditures  can  be  reduced.  However,  the  total 
amount of these expenditures is presently only about 3.8 percent of national 
income, including those by local governments. Thus, saving from this source 
is quite limited. Others argue that defense expenditures should be cut. Again, 
the magnitude is very small, since total defense expenditure is only about 1.26 
percent of national  income.  Still others argue that if  the amount of national 
debt is reduced by  further pushing the “fiscal reconstruction,” interest pay- 
ment could be reduced.  Unfortunately,  saving from this source is also quite 
marginal.  l3 
In its final report (March 1983), the Rinji Gyosei Chosakai (Ad Hoc Coun- 
cil on Administrative Reform) set a long-term objective of  maintaining  the 
Y  National income. 
Then, 
M/Y = (Ml + MJY = (m>Nv  + m&”)  /  Y 
= (rn,N/Y) “,IN  + (m,/m,)  (NJN)]. 
Using the present values, M/Y = 0.0556, n,/N = 0.897,  NJN = 0.103, and mJm, = 5.22. 
m)N/Y  is calculated as 0.0388. Using this value and assuming that the value of  mJm, remains 
unchanged, the future value of M/Y is calculated from the population data. 
12.  In this examination, I chose 1985 as the base year since the increase in tax burden thereafter 
contains some short-term effects. 
13. Let us  suppose that the so called “deficit financing bond” (akaji kosai) of the general ac- 
count budget is totally eliminated. Since the total outstanding amount of this bond (Y69 trillion 
at the end of  1988) is 25.7 percent of the total outstanding debt of the general government (Y268 
trillion), interest payment by  the general government would be reduced from the present level of 
5.4 percent of national income to 4.0 percent. The saving is therefore only 1.4 percent of national 
income. 
The condition may even deteriorate, since the social security fund will be considerably reduced. 
Suppose that the fund of the Employees’ Pension (Y72  trillion at the end of 1988) vanishes in the 
future, as predicted by  the Ministry of Welfare. Since this amounts to 35.5 percent of the total 
financial assets of the general government (Y203 trillion at the end of  1988), interest receipts of 
the general government will fall from the present level of 4.3 percent of national income to 2.7 
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nation burden at a significantly lower level than the present European level of 
about 50 percent of  national  income. Recently,  the Rinji Gyosei  Kaikaku 
Suishin Shingikai (Council for Promoting Administrative Reform) revised the 
objective and recommended that the ratio of  national burden to national in- 
come must be about 45 percent at the beginning of the next century and below 
50 percent in 2020. The above analysis indicates that it would be very difficult 
to achieve these objectives. 
9.5  The Role of the Consumption Tax 
The question, then,  is what tax should be used  to collect the additional 
revenue required. In order to examine this issue, I undertook a simple simu- 
lation analysis (tables 9.9 and 9.10). 
I first distinguish between working people and retired people. I assume that 
all wage income and business income are earned by the former and that inter- 
est income is distributed according to the ratio of population. As for transfer 
payments from the government, I assume that working people receive one- 
half of medical expenses. I further assume that all direct taxes on household 
and social security contributions are borne by working people (i.e., I neglect 
tax on interest income). 
Then, figures for a through i in table 9.9 are obtained for 1985 from the 
National Account Statistics (the figures in the table are ratios to national in- 
come). Note that in these statistics, social security contribution paid by  em- 
ployers is included in both wage income and social security contribution. In 
defining disposable income, I neglect transfer receipts other than pension pay- 
ments (i.e., “disposable income” in  the tables is disposable pecuniary  in- 
come). 
Figures for k, 1, and n in the table are per capita values. These are expressed 
in terms of the ratio to per capita national income and are calculated using the 
ratio of population.14  Thus in 1985, the ratio of per capita pension to per capita 
gross income, which I call “gross replacement ratio,” is 0.418. The ratio of 
per capita pension to per capita disposable income, which I call “net replace- 
ment ratio,” is 0.525. 
In estimating the figures for 2020, I note that in the present fiscal system 
about two-thirds of  social security payments are financed by  social security 
contributions and the rest by taxes. Assuming that national burden increases 
by  16 percentage points from 1985 to 2020, the ratio of social security contri- 
14.  Let N,  N,, and N, be  total population and the number of  working and  retired people, 
respectively. Let Y and y be national income and per capita national income. Then, for example, 
letting P denote total pension payment,  per capita pension in  terms of the ratio to per capita 
national income is calculated by 
PIN,)ly = P*N! (N,*Y) = (P !  Y)l[NjN]  = j7j 
Here I define  Nw  as the population of age 20-64,  and N,  as the population of age 65 and over 224  Yukio Noguchi 
Table 9.9  Effects of Increased Burden (increase in direct tax) 
1985  2020 
Working  Retired  Working  Retired 
Macro 
a. Wage income 
b. Business income 




g. Direct tax 
h. Social security contribution 
i. Disposable income = 
j. Population share 
d +  f -  (g +  h) 
0.689 
0.151 


















k. Income =  d/j  1.557  0.176 
I.  Pension =  f/j  0.650 
I/k(w)  (0.418) 
n. Disposal income =  iij  1.239  0.826 
0. Net replacement 
ratio =  I/n(w)  (0.525) 




















,729  0.161 
0.877 
(0.507) 
,068  1.038 
(0.821) 
Source: 1985 figures are from the National Account Statistics, Economic Planning Agency, Year- 
book ofNutional Account Statistics (Tokyo: Government Printing Bureau,  1991). 
Notes: Figures for a-i  are in terms of  the ratio to national income. Figures fork,  I, and n are in 
terms of  the ratio to per capita national income; k(w) and  n(w) are those of  working people. 
Working people are age 20-64.  Retired people are over 65. 
Assumptions: National burden increases by  16 percentage points. All increments in tax take the 
form of direct tax on working people. 
butions  to national  income  will  rise  by  10.7 percentage points  and  that of 
taxes will rise by about 5.3 percentage points  if the present  system remains 
unchanged. 
9.5.1  Increase in Direct Tax 
Let us first assume that all the increment in taxes takes the form of  direct 
tax on working people (i.e., individual income tax).  Then, in 2020 tax on 
working people and social security contribution will be 14.0  percent and 21.4 
percent of national income, respectively. I further assume that public pension 
payments will increase by  14 percentage points  in terms of  the ratio to na- 
tional  income and that the  shares of  factor incomes will remain unchanged 
from  those  in  1985.15 Then, by  the  same  procedure  as  before,  figures  k 
through o can be calculated for 2020 as shown in table 9.9. 
15. This is true if the production function is Cobb-Douglas (unitary elasticity of substitution) 
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Table 9.10  Effects of Increased Burden, Alternative policies, 2020 
Consumption Tax  Plus Tax on Pension 




g’. Direct tax 
h‘. Social security contribution 
i‘. Disposable 
income =  d +  f -  (g +  h) 
p.  Consumption tax 
q. Adjusted income =  d -  p 
r. Adjusted disposable income = 
0.925  0.038 
0.207 
0.087  0.0 
0.214  0.0 
0.624  0.245 
0.037  0.016 
0.888  0.022 
i-p  0.587  0.229 
~~ 
0.925  0.038 
0.207 
0.087  0.019 
0.195  0.0 
0.643  0.226 
0.037  0.016 
0.888  0.022 
0.606  0.210 
Per capita 
s. Adjusted income = q/j  1.660  0.093  1.660  0.093 
1.  Pension  0.877  0.797 
m‘. Gross replacement ratio= I/s(w)  (0.528)  (0.480) 
t. Adjusted disposable income =  r/j  1.097  0.970  1.133  0.890 
0’.  Net replacement ratio = l/t(w)  (0.799)  (0.785) 
Nores: See notes to table 9.9. The assumptions are: In the “consumption tax” case, all increments 
in  tax burden are financed by the consumption tax. In the “plus tax on pension” case, pension 
benefit is taxed at 9 percent, and the revenue is used to reduce social security contribution. 
Note first that disposable income of working people (in terms of the ratio to 
national income) falls significantly due to increases in tax and social security 
contribution. In per capita terms, income grows due to decrease in the relative 
number of working people. Disposable income falls even in per capita terms. 
Per capita pension receipts will grow from 65 percent of per capita national 
income in 1985 to 87.7 percent in 2020. The gross replacement ratio will rise 
from 0.418 in  1985 to 0.507 in 2020. This change may appear fairly mild. 
However, the distinction between gross and net replacement ratios becomes 
very important. In fact, a dramatic change occurs in the net replacement ratio: 
it will rise from 0.525 in 1985 to 0.821 in 2020. Namely, per capita pension 
receipt will become as high as 82.1 percent of per capita disposable income 
of working people. Since this is an average of the Employees’ Pension and the 
People’s Pension, and since payment level of the former is much higher than 
the latter, it is probable that pension receipts will become greater than dispos- 
able income of average workers for most recipients of the former. In terms of 
disposable income (i.e., including interest income of retired people), that of 
retired people will become almost the same as that of workers even in average 
values, If transfer payments other than public pension are included in the def- 
inition  of  disposable  income, that  of  retired  people would  become signifi- 
cantly greater than that of working people. This is clearly absurd, since people 
It is quite possible that the share of  interest income will rise because a significant part of  the 
national asset will be held in the form of  overseas assets, whose rate of  return is exogenously 
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of working age need more income than do the retired. Considering the differ- 
ence in the number of household  members, it can be argued that per capita 
disposable income of working-age people should be about 50 percent greater 
than that of the retired. 
9.5.2  Alternative Policies 
What measures should be taken to remedy the above situation? Of course, 
the most direct measure is to lower the payment level of public pensions. This, 
however, is politically very difficult. Hence I will examine whether tax poli- 
cies can alter the situation. 
First, let us consider the case in which consumption tax alone is used to 
finance the necessary  increment in tax revenue, which is 5.3 percent of na- 
tional income.  l6  I assume that the burden will be distributed among working 
and retired people in  proportion  to population,  i.e., by ratios  of  0.69 and 
0.31  .I7 Then the burden of the former will be 3.7 percent of national income 
and that of the latter will be 1.6 percent of national income. 
The resulting situation is equivalent to the one in which income and dispos- 
able income (except for pension) of working and retired people are reduced 
with unchanged  price levels by 3.7 and  1.6 percent of  national income, re- 
spectively.  These are shown as “adjusted income” and “adjusted disposable 
income” in table 9.10. 
On the other hand, the real value of  a pension will be unchanged if pension 
payments are fully indexed. Thus, replacement ratios can be obtained by  di- 
viding pension payments by adjusted income and adjusted disposable income. 
The results are shown on the left-hand  side of table 9.10. Net replacement 
ratio will fall to 0.799. Disposable  income of  a retired  person  will become 
smaller than that of a worker. 
Next, let  us  suppose that  pension  receipts  are taxed at the  same rate as 
workers’ income in 1985 (about 9 percent).I9 I assume that the revenue is used 
to reduce  social security payment. In this case, the gross replacement ratio 
will  fall  to 0.480 and  the net  replacement  ratio  will  become  0.785 (table 
9.10). Although the relative disposable income of the retired seems to be still 
higher, the situation is considerably improved. 
Politically, the easiest way to increase the burden is to rely on increases of 
the income tax revenue, which would automatically happen if the income tax 
16. In FY 1990, expected consumption tax revenue is 1.63  percent of national income. In order 
to obtain the necessary revenue in 2020 (6.93 percent of national income), the tax rate would have 
to be raised from the present 3 percent to 12.3 percent, assuming that the statutory tax base is 
unchanged and that the amount of tax base (in terms of the ratio to national income) is unaffected 
by increased tax rate. 
17. Here I neglect the possibility that per capita consumption of the working people is in gen- 
eral greater than that of the retired because of expenses for children. 
18.  In the original paper, I failed to take this effect into account. The necessity of considering 
this was pointed out by Tatsuo Hatta. 
19.  Under the present tax law, pension receipts are taxable income. In practice, however, they 
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law remained unchanged. The above analysis shows a serious problem in this 
scenario. It can be argued that raising the consumption tax rate is necessary to 
spread the high tax burden  as evenly as possible  in a society in which tax 
burden is growing. 
It has been pointed out that there is a transition effect of tax reform: namely, 
if the consumption tax rate is raised, the present working generation bears a 
heavier lifetime burden than that of other generations because they presently 
bear the major burden of income tax. The analysis presented above shows that 
the intergenerational  transfer caused by the public pension system is greater 
than the transition effect of the tax reform. 
9.6  Undiscussed Issues and Concluding Remarks 
Several important issues were not discussed in this paper. 
The first issue is the reexamination of  the social security system.  In this 
paper, I assumed that the present system will be maintained.  It is of course 
conceivable to fundamentally modify the system and reduce benefit levels. In 
fact, this issue should be the starting point of the debate on tax reform. If we 
choose to keep the present social security system intact and go the route of the 
European welfare state, the goal of a tax reform should be to create a system 
capable of raising taxes to the European level. If we abandon the idea of a 
welfare state and decide to reform the system, assigning only limited func- 
tions to the government, tax reforms would naturally have different goals; in 
particular,  it would  be  necessary  to offer incentives for people  to save for 
retirement.  Since the present  tax treatments  of different types of  saving de- 
vices are quite unsystematic and inequitable, this issue is very important. 
The second issue is the long-term effect on saving and external performance 
of the economy. In the analysis in section 9.5, I assume that macroeconomic 
conditions are unaffected by the choice of taxes to finance social security ex- 
penditures.  Needless to say, this is not warranted. Whether consumption tax 
or income tax is used to finance increased social security expenditures would 
have significant impacts on the long-term performance of the economy, espe- 
cially on the saving rate. 
In principle,  there are two possible effects, substitution and distributional. 
Since a consumption tax exempts saving, it would increase saving relative to 
when the income tax is used, unless elasticity of substitution is very small. 
Since a consumption tax imposes a relatively smaller burden on those who are 
in the process of saving, it would increase macroeconomic  saving relative to 
when the income tax is used. 
I have examined this issue elsewhere by using an overlapping-generations 
simulation model originally developed by Auerbach and Kotlikoff (Noguchi 
1987b). My basic conclusion was that Japan’s current external surplus will 
become a deficit in 2015 and will enlarge to as much as -  7.5 percent of GDP 
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expenditures.  On the other hand, it will remain positive in 2015 and will be 
-  3.4 percent of GDP if a consumption tax is used instead. In this way,  the 
use of a consumption tax will alleviate Japan’s external deficit problem in the 
future. 
Needless to say, the use of a consumption tax would enlarge Japan’s exter- 
nal  surplus in the near future. It must be noted that the difference is small, 
however,  since the amount to be financed  is still small. When the need for 
financing  social  security  expenditures becomes  large,  Japan’s  saving  rate 
would become considerably  lower than the present level. Preventing Japan’s 
saving rate from falling too much would therefore be desirable from the inter- 
national viewpoint also. 
Although the consumption tax was introduced in April 1989, the issue has 
not yet been settled. In the 1989 upper house election, the opposition parties 
chose the abolition  of  the consumption tax  as the main  political  issue and 
obtained a “landslide  victory.” The political discussions  were very myopic, 
however, in the sense that most of them were concerned with the details of the 
consumption tax. Very few discussions were held on long-term problems such 
as the ones discussed in this paper. 
If these problems are seriously considered, discussion must focus on revis- 
ing the present tax so that it can finance the increased fiscal needs. From this 
standpoint, the following points are important: 
Reexamination of the “simplified  taxation method,”  which allows deduc- 
tion of a certain percentage of  sales regardless of the actual purchase. 
Reform from the  present  subtraction  method  with no invoices  to a tax 
credit method with invoices. 
Reexamination of the exemption level, which is presently too generous. 
Earmarking the consumption tax revenue for social security expenditures. 
Another round of tax reform  will be necessary  in the near  future to deal 
with these issues. 
Appendix 
An Outline of Japanese Social Security and Private 
Pensions 
The Japanese social security system consists of three major components: pub- 
lic assistance, social insurance, and other welfare programs. The social insur- 
ance system, which consists of health insurance, public pensions, and unem- 
ployment compensation, is the most important of the three, especially from 
the fiscal viewpoint. 
The social insurance system in Japan is complex because people of different 
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in the system is among employees of  private firms, government employees, 
and the self-employed.  In the case of public pensions, employees of private 
firms belong to the Employees’ Pension (Kosei Nenkin), the self-employed to 
the People’s Pension  (Kokumin Nenkin), and government employees to the 
Cooperative Pension (Kyosai Nenkin). 
Contributions to the Employees’ Pension are determined in terms of their 
ratio to “regular  earning,”  which  is wage eamings minus bonuses.  For the 
People’s Pension, contributions are set at fixed amounts. 
Administrative  arrangements vary as well.  Health insurance for the  self- 
employed is operated by local governments, that for employees of  large pri- 
vate firms is operated by cooperatives in each firm, and all other programs are 
operated by special accounts of the national government. For most programs, 
subsidies are provided from the general account budget; that is, the programs 
are financed by both social security contributions and taxes. 
In Japan, the phrase social security is used in a different way from that in 
the United States: it includes not only public pension programs but also med- 
ical insurance programs and various welfare programs. In this paper, I use the 
words in this broader sense. 
Private pensions play certain roles in supplementing the public pension pro- 
grams. The most important schemes are the Employees’ Pension Fund (Kosei 
Nenkin Kikin) and the Tax-Qualified Pension (Zeisei Tekikaku Nenkin). The 
former is similar to the British contracting-out system, while the latter is sim- 
ilar to the U.S. corporate pension system. 
Tax treatments  of private pension programs are similar to those of public 
pensions. The number of workers covered was about 7.9 million for the for- 
mer and about 7.3  million for the latter in 1986. Together they amount to more 
than half of the workers covered by the government’s Employees’  Pension, 
which  is about 27 million  (there are some duplications  in these numbers). 
Accumulated funds were  Y 14.5 trillion for the former and  Y8.3  trillion for 
the latter at the end of FY 1986. They amount to more than one-third of the 
funds of the Employees’  Pension, which were about  Y  55 trillion at the end 
of FY 1986. 
Private pension plans for individuals are sold by  insurance companies and 
the post offices. However, their importance is not so large (the accumulated 
fund was about Y  3 trillion at the end of FY 1986). 
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Comment  Hiromitsu Ishi 
I find Yukio Noguchi's paper very suggestive and instructive. If we admit his 
assumptions and basic framework, this paper will automatically lead us to his 
results, although some assumptions look very heroic. It is difficult to find any 
serious defects in the paper. His argument is very robust. Most remarkably, he 
clarifies the apparent effects of two tax structures, direct tax and VAT,  on each 
age group, working or retired, in an aging population. 
Many people in Japan have discussed predictions of tax effects on different 
age groups under different tax schemes, but no one has so far tried to quantify 
future tax burdens in relation to the demographic change. In this sense, No- 
guchi's  results should be considered when deciding whether to introduce the 
VAT  to Japan. 
Let me raise a couple of points. First, what kind of policy implications does 
Noguchi derive from his estimated results? Needless to say, estimated results 
are extreme cases and merely serve as reference points for further discussion. 
In order to reach more practical  or realistic  conclusions,  he might consider 
some combination of restricted  tax increase and reductions of social security 
benefits. 
Second, related to the first point, all estimates are based on the assumption 
that the present social security system will remain  unchanged.  As Noguchi 
fully understands, however, this assumption is quite unrealistic.  Many people 
Hiromitsu Ishi is professor of economics at Hitotsubashi University. 231  Aging of Population, Social Security, and Tax Reform 
agree that further reforms in the social security system must cut benefits in the 
future. We  need  ideas for reform of  the present social security system. In 
particular, Japan’s demographic changes will increase the relative share of the 
group over age 85, as compared with less-old retirees. Will this special feature 
be important in the reconstruction of the social security system? 
Third, Noguchi mentioned the emergence of the “bulge generation” (dankai 
sedai) in the demographic structure, caused by the baby boom immediately 
following the war. Toward 2020, this generation will play a vital role in main- 
taining Japan’s social security system. This generation may wish to choose 
their own self-supporting scheme apart from the public pension, although in 
practice it’s almost impossible. At  least they will have reason to complain 
about the big gap between their contribution and benefits over a life-cycle 
period. If possible, they may get out of the public pension scheme and move 
to a private pension, mainly because the private scheme could benefit them 
more. How will the bulge generation influence improvements to social secu- 
rity? 
Comment  Maria S. Gochoco 
Yukio Noguchi’s paper documents the changing demographic structure in Ja- 
pan, particularly the aging of the population, and the need to find sources of 
revenue to finance projected increases in pension payments. It proposes the 
use of  an indirect tax, namely, the consumption tax, as an alternative to the 
current use of  direct taxes in the form of  income taxes and social security 
contributions.  The  author  contends  that  the  use  of  the  consumption  tax 
achieves a greater degree of intergenerational equity in terms of tax burden. 
I have  two sets of  comments: one takes issue with some of  the technical 
aspects of the paper and the other consists of suggestions regarding the overall 
framework of the study. 
In footnote 9, Noguchi presents the equation he uses to forecast the ratio of 
public pension payments to national income (RPEN) as a function of the ratio 
of  people over age 65 to total population (R65) and a dummy variable. It is 
the following estimated over the period 1965-86: 
RPEN = -6.7  + 1.3 R65 -  0.9 DUMMY 
The estimated values of  RPEN  are presented  in  column (A) of  table 9.7, 
which I reproduce here and compare with R65, or C/D taken from table 9.4. 
First of  all, table 9C.1 implies that in the years to come the formula for 
calculating benefits will change as an increasing proportion of the population 
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Table 9C. 1 
Year  RPEN (%)  R65 (%) 
1985  6.7  10.3 
2000  14.6  16.3 
2010  19.4  20.0 
2020  24.1  23.6 
composed of those age 65 and over receive an increasing share of  national 
income in the form of  pension payments. 
It is important to ask, therefore, whether the author’s forecasting equation 
for RPEN is appropriate. The equation for RPEN implies that a 1% increase 
in R65 gives rise to a 1.3% increase in RPEN. This is why the author obtains 
the result that pension receipts become larger than the disposable income of 
workers. However, one may take issue with the author’s estimating the RPEN 
equation over the 1965-85  period. A look at the trend in RPEN in table 9.2 
strongly suggests a structural break between  1973 and  1974. This structural 
break may not be adequately accounted for by the DUMMY variable in the 
RPEN equation.  Furthermore, there appears to be a decelerating rate of in- 
crease in RPEN between  1974 and  1979 and between  1980 and  1987, for 
example, which means that a linear function fitted for these years will tend to 
overestimate RPEN. My suggestion is for the author to reestimate RPEN from 
1974 onward with the appropriate functional form. 
More generally,  while it is clear that the consumption tax is preferable to 
direct taxation  on equity  grounds,  the  problem  is  that  it  hits  the  working 
people as well. While the consumption tax can be used to reduce the income 
tax burden  on the  working group, a scheme that subjects the old to global 
income  taxation  would  be  superior  to  simply  using  the  consumption  tax. 
Global taxation of old people’s incomes would allow for smaller increases in 
the consumption tax, a point that should not be taken lightly, since a mere 3% 
consumption tax almost cost the ruling LDP the last election. The author sug- 
gests that cutting pension payments is politically infeasible. In addition, it is 
also unfair because all pensioners are taxed regardless of  where their income 
comes from. A reduction in pension payments taxes the old who have little or 
no other source of income besides pension payments and the old who have a 
lot of interest income. Again, global taxation of old people’s incomes leads to 
greater equity. 
Finally, Japan might consider a change in its employment4-etirement policy 
in the direction of lengthening the working years. Such a policy change would 
alter the dimensions of the problem addressed in this paper. 233  Aging of Population, Social Security, and  Tax Reform 
Comment  Charles E. McLure, Jr. 
Yukio Noguchi  makes a convincing case that the social security  system of 
Japan  is in serious trouble.  This is shown by  his statistics on the national 
burden,  dependency  ratios,  and the ratio of social security cost to national 
income. This may come as a surprise to those who believe that social security 
is inadequate in Japan. Noguchi argues that demographics, and not inadequate 
benefits, explains this perception. Replacement ratios are actually quite gen- 
erous by international standards, but the covered population is still young. As 
the social security system matures, its finance will become increasingly bur- 
densome. 
Every means of dealing with the anticipated fiscal implications has political 
problems.  Reducing benefits directly or reducing them indirectly, by taxing 
benefits,  are  both  said  to  be  politically  unacceptable.  Financing  currently 
scheduled benefits through increases in payroll taxes would impose unaccept- 
able tax rates on the  working population.  Noguchi  suggests  an alternative, 
using increased consumption tax revenues to finance social security expendi- 
tures. One wonders whether this is any more likely to be politically acceptable 
than the other solutions. After all, increasing consumption taxes is tantamount 
to imposing a capital levy on existing wealth. If Noguchi’s scheme were im- 
plemented,  pensioners  would  join  housewives  in  opposition  to  the  VAT. 
Moreover, if pensions are indexed for inflation, increasing consumption taxa- 
tion will not reduce the real  income of pensioners,  as required for financial 
soundness. 
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